Crisis in Kazakhstan: What’s at stake for Washington
By Douglas M. BLOOMFIELD

The recent firings of Minister of Defense and head of the Committee of National Security in Astana focused attention of official Washington on the events in this important Central Asian country. President Nazarbaev’s exercise in damage control over the embarrassing “MiG affair” in the Baku airport , when Kazakhstani fighter planes, allegedly sold to Serbia, were intercepted by Heydar Aliev and returned back to Kazakhstan. Firing of his close associates will not diminish the fact that Nazarbaev’s administration attempted to take a hostile step towards the United States.

And the problems don’t end there: the romantic period of the U.S.-Kazakhstani relations are over. Washington is increasingly uneasy and embarassed by new authoritarianism exhibited by Central Asian rulers, such as Kazakhstani President Nursultan Nazarbaev. Initially, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan was a major headache for Americans, as it contained the remnants of the Soviet nuclear deterrent. As negotiations to successfully denuclearize the new independent state were successfully completed, the West fell in love with the specter of making Central Asians “just like us”. New vocabulary, such as “free markets” and “democracy” were quickly learnt by the well-educated Kazakh elite, and used with the same ease as the Soviet-era Marxist terminology under the communist rule.

And there were some glimpses of hope: in 1994-1997, Kazakhstan conducted one one of the most advanced and ambitious market reform programs, executed by the then-Prime Minister A.M. Kazhegeldin. Such organizations as US AID and the World Bank were full of praise – and hope – for the nascent Central Asian state.

However, President Nazarbaev became somewhat enamored with the so-called “Asian model”. The U.S. already had negative experiences with Asian crony capitalism, in places like Korea and Indonesia, and prior to that, the Philippines, were the U.S. often needed to interfere to help oust a too greedy dictator. Many in Washington still remember Mrs. Marcos’s gargantuan shoe collection, or the abuses of the Sukharto family. There, too, sons and daughters, cousins and sons-in-law grabbed a multi-billion dollar economic empire, while millions went hungry and forlorn. U.S. policy makers know all too well how the powers that be announced thirty year development plans, promising to make Malaysia or Indonesia “the first” to build a 21^st century, modern capital, or build the indigenous air plane or car, while engineering multi-billion dollar schemes to defraud the national treasury.

State Department officials and congressmen remember all too well how rampaging mobs in the streets of Djakarta and Seul generated chaos, damaged American businesses and harmed foreign investments.

And herein lies the rub: if the current regime in Astana cannot generate real stability through democratic development, multi-million dollar Western investments in Kazakhstan cannot be safe. The U.S. political elite believes that in the complex technology-intensive society of the twenty first century, only democracy is strong enough to secure real stability. Only democracy, which empowers millions of people to take charge of their own life and destiny, allows them to independently run their businesses, city blocks and regions.

Another point of concern for Americans, especially in the business community, is the pervasive corruption. Kazakhstan is in the league of its own – with Presidential family controlling the leading media channels, customs, security service, alcohol monopoly and oil trade. U.S. business have repeatedly complained to the U.S. Congress and the Clinton Administration that their ability to conduct investment in Kazakhstan is severely limited by the lack of the rule of law.

Finally, the “political culture” of Kazakhstan – or lack thereof -- is becoming a known quantum in Washington. All this incessant talk about democratization, against a brutal reality of dispersing two parliaments and violating international norms in the 1999 presidential elections could not escape attention of Washington’s experts and decision makers. President Nazarbaev’s visit to the American capital during the May 1999 NATO summit was a flop, with Nazarbaev not being allowed to see either President Clinton or Vice President Gore one-on-one, and public being outright hostile at the public events, such as President’s presentation at the Carnegie Endowment.

All this explains the attention the Clinton Administration and the U.S. Congress pays to affairs of Kazakhstan. It is the U.S. interest they defend: interest that involves democracy, human rights, independence – and, yes, ability to invest safely. This explains the warning Vice President Al Gore personally delivered to President Nazarbaev not to attempt to “steal” presidential elections – a warning Nazarbaev ignored with great audacity – but also at a great peril to himself. This also explains why Ambassador Steven Sestanovich, at a Congressional hearing, proclaimed democracy a top U.S. Government priority in that country. And, of course, that is why two important committees of the U.S. Congress – The Helsinki Commission and the Human Rights Caucus, have conducted hearings on Kazakhstan in the span of two months. This is why Congress passed two important amendments to the Silk Road legislation which is sponsored by the influential Chairman of the House International Relations Committee, who recently, at the Congress floor, while introducing these amendments, called democratization in Kazakhstan “dubious”. On July 15, Gilman met and warmly received the opposition leader Kazhegeldin.

All these are warnings that Astana needs to heed. At stake are vital assets for the young state: further U.S. assistance to Astana, the World Bank and IMF credits, the future of foreign investment – and Kazakhstan’s prestige in the world arena.

Douglas M. Bloomfield, a veteran expert on the U.S. Congress and foreign policy, is a Washington-based syndicated columnist. His articles appear in many newspapers around the country.

Received via e-mail, july 1999