* * *

In this case Kazakhstan will immediately transfer from one political "family" to another and will change the political "relations". One simple question should be answered: whom, what nations can we be compared to, at least roughly, by the level of legal maturity and degree of political civilization?

Let it be not Europe and not the USA. But, it is hardly the Baltic states, hardly even Russia or Ukraine. Do we differ from Belarus, for example, and if so, in what way? Isn’t it high time our state tries its best to reach at least for the “peaks” of democracy and rule of law conquered by Belarus which have not trampled down by Lukashenko yet? And what do we look like on the background of our Central Asian neighbors, the Caucasus states? How things stand in Kazakhstan from the point of view of elective power and rotation of central, supreme power compared to, say, Armenia or Georgia? And do our political realities have anything in common with the current situation in Uzbekistan, Tadjikistan or Turkmenia? Or we should compare our political biography with the political biographis of Iraq, Syria, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines? …

Furthermore we will have to answer the questions as to the true reasons for such a significant deviations from conventional, and most importantly, declared standards of civilized policy. Besides it is necessary to answer a tough, even a cruel question as to who exactly is the stumbling block here from the social point of view. Which social groups and political forces thanks to their “underdevelopment" do not allow us (those left) to live right now in the civilized, democratic society? Simply speaking, who are these people, thanks to whom all of us will have to grope for our way in the authoritarian desert for another several decades, and thanks to whom obsolete “Asian” features will long dominate in our "Eurasian" character on legal and theoretically justified basis?

When attempts are made to convince us that Kazakhstan is not ready yet to live in conditions of the developed or even usual, more or less standard, democracy, the vague pronoun “we" is usually used (“we are not ready”). This rhetoric is not accidental. Psychologically it creates a very convenient confusion. We means “all together”, it is a kind of arithmetical mean of our aggregate, allegedly common and evenly distributed civilization or, on the contrary, underdevelopment.

The statesman using such words appears noble and generous in his own way. He says “we" in order not to tell the people “you”, in order not to address to the people with “you” from the height of his personal civilization when making claims or giving the unflattering characteristics.

Actually these “polite” euphemisms insult the morally and mentally healthy nation. If we have any social and political ballast that, thanks to its backwardness, does not allow the authorities to respect even standard, elementary political rules, the authorities must straightforwardly and unequivocally name these social groups, these political forces, the independent initiatives, etc. They will have to name them not in vacuum but looking right into the eyes of these people! And then let people think for themselves as to who, suffering from political backwardness, actually pushes our society to the back: the people - or the power representatives who try to teach the people.

Here logically follows another question: if our society is for the moment still immature from the point of view of its political and civil progress, who exactly will educate it during all this period, introducing step-by-step to the world of the elementary laws and civilized political relations? This is a problem, symmetric to the previous one: who are these people, that left behind the rest of the society (to cut it short, their own people) from the political and moral, legal and civil development standpoint to such an extent that they are in a position to teach others? Who are these people, that while waiting in the democracy for others to catch up, allegedly “have” to now and then violate the legally declared democratic standards thus going against their own principles and wishes? And where these political aliens come from to the territory of modern Kazakhstan , intended to implant a civilization of higher level among the backward part of mankind?

But even if we agree that someone will lead us in breach of normal democratic procedures, training us this way in democracy at their own discretion and in terms convenient for them, there will arise the question as to the sincerity of these very intentions. What actually the authorities are focused on: to implant rule of law or to make the people get used to living without any rights? To improve the freedom or to minimize even what is left?

* * *

What we are speaking about is the task to reveal in the authorities’ rhetoric the basic ideological intention, the direction of main ideological and propaganda effort.

If these intentions are genuine, then the residual non-democratic character of our society should be the main problem faced by the authorities and debated in the society. The alternative is simple. either we consider every deviation from the conventional democratic standards as an emergency situation, as an impermissible error, even as a crime against the existing legislation. Or on the contrary, we use all the power of ideological services and propaganda machine to justify these deviations, and to comfort ourselves and others that these “details” do not change the essence of the regime. And even to justify these deviations by our transition specificity.

Really, what are we trying to eventually achieve through this ideological effort: to convince and overcome the pathology or, on the contrary, to accept is as a standard?

It is easy to understand that abundant reasonings about the “Eurasian character”, “the special path” and other matters produced by our ideological industry thick as blackberries serve to solve the task of normalization of the pathology.

* * *

Calling our state the Republic of Kazakhstan, we are already committed to absolutely clear-cut obligations aimed to ensure genuine democracy.

And no historical, national specificity, no “consensus and hierarchic" traditions can not be considered an excuse if people are deprived of the right to choose, and the power places itself above the society.

The ideology of the state can and should take into account our historical and national features. But in doing so the power has to answer the question as to the way to fulfill the democratic obligations before the people and the world in these conditions, instead of justifying different evasions from strict fulfillment of these obligations.

* * *

Frankly speaking all the above were rather political, civil moral reasonings. In other words we debated them as problems of political conscience, intellectual fairness, civil courage of the representatives of power and even of their common human decency.

But there is another aspect, a tougher and more definite one. I am speaking about the Law and Rights. And first of all about the constitutional law.

We have already got used to and do not see anything criminal in the fact that the authorities and the regime's ideological servants keep talking that our society should long-and gradually approach really democratic standards of state political and civil systems. And the country's leaders keep confirming that they adhere to these theories, maintaining and supporting clearly undemocratic, illegal standards and practice. On this background they put forward extremely poor "democratization" initiatives that thanks to their practical nullity can't arouse any other feelings except bitterness and shame.

But current situation is unacceptable not because these ideas are doubtful both for the moment and in particular for the future.

In our hot political debates we overlook that we already have gotthe Principle Law. We already have got the Constitution of Republic of Kazakhstan. The foundations of this document have already been lying on all the indispensable basic standards guaranteeing civil freedoms and realization of genuine democracy.

In our Constitution nothing is told about a long and difficult path to normal democracy (that is, to observing the standards, written in the Constitution).

We shall not find any words in our Constitution about "the special path", which Kazakhstan allegedly should follow in order to come to the civilized society.

Nothing is told in the Constitution that it provides for issuing anti-democratic laws "of the second level" and subordinate legislation contradicting the basic standards of the Constitution on the ground that we have not been up to the true democracy yet, and we are going to it along a "special" road.

Even minimum logic must bring us to recognize that all reflections on our political immaturity and being unprepared for democracy, about “the special features" of our state and the political system are of downright anticonstitutional nature, a constitutional crime subject to legal punishment.

Frankly speaking, could anyone imagine that the representatives of authorities and state ideology say the Criminal Code can still be violated under definite circumstances? That it can be violated, for example, on the ground that we, firstly, for the moment have not been developed enough for normal orderliness, and secondly, are going to keep being law-abiding not like everybody else but in our special, say, “Euroasian" fashion? Could anyone imagine, that the authorities publicly declare that until legal society is build in Kazakhstan it places itself above the law, and is not obliged to respect the principle of independence of courts, etc., etc.?

Here a simple alternative follows. The first option is to rewrite the Constitution and to accept such an edition, which would not only consolidate the transient and especial nature of our society, but also would explain, in what way this specificity must manifest itself, in what limitations and modifications of common democracy it is to be realized. Or, alternatively, it is imperative right now to strictly observe the existing Principle Law instead of ideological and propaganda shows of poor and in point of fact dummy “democratization" of the state which is already democratic under the Constitution.

Here I am not going to force anyone make this or that choice, though I have my own and quite clear-cut opinion regarding that. Only theoretically I do not rule out the possibility of the first option, namely to specify in the Constitution not democratic in the common sense of this word, but any other standards and principles, possibly even dictatorial and dynasty ones.

For the moment I categorically insist only that this or that choice nevertheless should be made. And this choice must be made accountable and, most importantly, public. There is nothing more humiliating for the people and the country than life under a wrong name, that pretending to be not what one actually is and even is not going to become. It is like to wear stolen clothes, even very much respectable.

* * *

I am speaking not proceeding from general reasons of moral, but proceeding from estimations of the already existing reality.

The presidential elections of January 10, 1999 are known to be held in breach of the civilized rules. They have greatly, and for the moment irreparably affected the international reputation of Kazakhstan.

Prior to the elections, during the pre-election campaign, the Kazakhstani authorities got a series of strict warnings almost ultimatum-like from the global community represented by international and law enforcement organizations. The demands were very concrete, and our authorities made a vow to meet these demands.

I believe (to be more precise, I know), that the further extremely negative reaction of the West regarding the presidential elections in Kazakhstan was predetermined not by the breaches of democratic procedures and elementary political rules themselves (these violations are widely spread in Central Asian region not only in Kazakhstan). The special attention was focused on the political double game of our authorities, namely the failure to keep promises and guarantees given to the West by the Kazakhstani authorities, both formally and in the course of contacts.

The civilized community does not like undemocratic regimes. But it turned out the civilized community can not have them attempting to present democratically-packed regimes and procedures which are rather far from observing the true democratic principles. In other words, they were shocked not by the quality of goods, but by the attempt to cheat through “unscrupulous advertising”. This resulted in the fact that Kazakhstan has become one of the region’s “number one" in the black book of regimes subject to obstruction. Among clearly unusual, extraordinary events were OSCE interim findings and the final report of this organization, the Department of State’s declarations and the US Congress’s hearings as well as documents prepared by law enforcement institutions.

One should take into account that the point is not in the moral and legal conviction only. For Kazakhstan its ruined reputation in the world entails very severe organizational foreign-policy and even economic consequences.

Besides this has already been of significant importance from the internal policy point of view and this effect will in due course become even greater. The point is that according to the in-depth sociological studies and expert polls data, the presidential rating was based very much on the President’s foreign reputation, he was a success as the “face of country” and he was respected abroad. He met practically on equal footing with the leaders of leading states. It is understandable when one speaks of the newly-established country, which only recently gained its sovereignty. I must admit that for me personally the President’s authority was based in many respects on his above merits, not on his business and organizational skills.

One can suppose that the residual level of sympathies to the president has not fallen yet only because the claims of the international community to Kazakhstan have been carefully disguised from the population, and the mass media controlled by the authorities, which makes practically all mass media, keep with even greater energy dwelling on the topic of internationally acknowledged reputation of the country and its leader.

However this all-embracing “political default” of the present authorities cannot be disguised ad infinitum. The information leaks even through the most strict information cordons and eventually becomes public. The negative effect turns out to be dual. Our state’s reputation is not only ruined. It turns out that the authorities even in these conditions keep telling the people about high international reputation of the country, how the international community respects and appreciates them. And all this happen on the background, as I have said above, of a complete “political default”!

Similarly it is no longer possible to explain, say, the tough position of the US regarding violations of human rights in Kazakhstan by the US vengeance for Kazakhstani policy in the area of oil production and transportation. The question arises, in what oil respect we have hurt the feelings of other OSCE member states which have been no less sympathetic about the elections campaign and results of the elections? Or perhaps we have also managed to hit any secret oil interests the Helsinki group, of Human Rights Watch?

* * *

What I am speaking about now is called “the loss of identity” in the language of political theory. Is turns out that we actually are not what we believe we are and what we present to others. Moreover, it turns out that this multiple personality is considered by the existing regime to be a planned and scheduled one, and that it actually is its real essence.

I am ready to admit the possibility that this scheme could suit a definite part of our society. I think it's possible that many would like to consider themselves citizens of a civilized, fully-fledged democratic society - and at the same time enjoy authoritarianism, voluntary and irresponsible subordination to the maturing dictatorship. But the whole people can not exist, especially exist for a long time, with the dualized political self-consciousness.

It is especially true in the case of the people of Kazakhstan, rather well-educated people who have gone through hard times and can't just possibly live long with this internal falsehood. When the actions of one's own state start to arouse not the feeling of pride but shame, when the manifestation of force starts to be governed by the authorities' trembling littleness but not dignity - the moment comes when one learn what "the loss of political identity" means from one's own experience.

* * *

So, where are we going to: democracy and civil society, genuine people's government and social progress - or right in the opposite direction?

When debating the concrete moments and concrete moves of the authorities it is not always possible to hit the truth: everybody concentrate on detail and shades of interpretations. If one is going to consider separately every ten centimeters of a road, it is difficult to define, where the road actually goes: up or down.

But if one sets to examine a more considerable section, all becomes obvious at once.

In order to get rid of any doubts over the direction in which Kazakhstan actually goes, a section of our socio-political progress of the length, say, approximately a year and a half will suffice.

If somebody still have questions concerning the vector of our development, let's recollect what our society and state were like approximately one year prior to presidential elections. What we represented recently, I mean, when the authority had not understood yet that the situation had been steadily getting worse and the prospects for the presidential elections to be held in 2000 are gloomy for the president?

I shall try my best to describe this on the basis of my personal political experience.

One year and a ha1fthere were independent newspapers and even TV channels in Kazakhstan which were not completely controlled by the authorities. I did not have any problems when I contacted them and they, in turn, did not encounter problems connected with their contacts with me.

There were obvious signs of revival in public life and the "amateur" public policy and it did not mean immediate response on the part of authorities.

In that time I got started working on my book "Kazakhstan: the right to choose". It did not even strike me that we would ever have problems with publishing the book not okayed by censor, that the circulation would be arrested, that it would be prohibited to publish the book in the Kazakh language, that the authorities would harass the mass media in which excerpts of the book were published.

As an independent politician I felt free to travel across the country, go abroad and come back home, meet common people and the executives of all levels from all the regions. The people who welcomed me as a dear guest did not know yet that they were already in the black books, that they will be thoroughly examined, and the "law-enforcement bodies" would be involved in this too.

Special service agents did not follow me everywhere and without hiding. Looking back I saw usual motor vehicles instead of the already familiar double motorcade with the plates and faces I knew so well. I heard voices of normal people, not special service agents' conversations over radio stations who followed me everywhere and that special slanguage they speak.

When I requested draft amendments to the Constitution and elections law, I believed that they would be considered in accordance with a normal procedure, and nobody would do one's best to avoid discussing them even without reading a line. When I passed these draft laws to governmental officials through my assistant I couldn't even imagine that he would be arrested, as if he had brought not a usual intellectual product, absolutely loyal from the point of view of the Constitution and the state, but conspiracy literature or parcels with heroin.

When the idea to establish a movement "For fair elections" struck my colleagues they did not expect at all that the authority’s reaction to this simple and brilliant idea would be hysterical, that special services agents would enter our meetings like the enemy's den. Who could think then that usual preparation for registration of the movement would serve as an excuse for conviction of many politicians "for participation in the activity of the non-registered organization"?

We had already encountered some cases of power pressure on opposition, on those whom authorities considered dangerous. For instance one should recollect episodes of lynching the Kazakhstani Cossack leaders. But who could imagine then that these episodes would become an everyday practice very soon and these large-scale events would take place not in provincial areas but right in the epicenter of our political life?

Could anyone possibly fancy that our special services and information bodies would deliberately disseminate false information on the political challengers to the president?

Could anyone fancy one year and a half back that the opposition newspapers would be set on fire, publishing houses and paper warehouses would be smeared, that the National Security Service would take part in riots, and we would experience endless attacks of tax police?

Could we until recently fancy that the authorities would order to fire us and even to beat people only for cooperation with a political opponent? Could we imagine that even women would be among those beaten in this way?

Yes, our legislation right then provided for the authorities' irremovability in any case, regardless of the vote results. But "democratization" of our legislation has resulted not in diminished but in the augmented odious provisions. We have significantly "improved" our laws, and now we … do not have age limitations for the presidential post, there are no limitations as to the number of terms in office, there is no requirement as to the minimum number of those who come to the polls, etc., etc. By the way, a year and a half back we had no provision that provided for barring unwelcome candidates from the elections campaign, for example, for crossing the road when the red light was on.

And finally, was it possible to fancy 1,5 years back that the global community would no longer view Kazakhstan as the region's civilization leader but consider it as one of the most odious members of the "black book" of those violating human rights and the elementary political principles?

What is most important, a year ago we had completely different hopes and completely different political aspirations.

Our perspectives were more or less clear. All of us were looking forward to the next presidential elections, namely elections 2000, that were to be normal at last.. We presumed that we at last will have the supreme power, which will be truly legitimate, and not established as a result of ambiguous procedures based on non-alternative voting. We hoped that the political life would have normalized by then and the elective law would have been adopted. Let it be not perfect but at least decent law where most odious and flagrant provisions will be ruled out.

We have been deprived of these perspectives. The attempt has been made to deprive us of hope.

To tell the truth many of us were already forced to live without hope.

Thanks God not all, far from that.

* * *

Having examined all the above are there any questions left as to where we are going and what is the direction of our evolution?

Let's now consider from this point of view the reasonings regarding our people being democratically immature yet, that our society is not yet ready for true democracy.

Does it mean that just a year and a half ago we were ready for the level of freedom, we had then, and now we are not ready even for that level?

Does it mean that it is the society and the people who politically degrade, getting less and less ready for democracy?

Or this process of political degradation rather refer not to the people but to the authorities, not to the society but to the regime?

All these questions are only rhetorical. The answers to them are obvious.

As a result of all these processes we have been facing a complete “ political default ” in Kazakhstan.

We have actually refused to fulfill our obligations.

We have refused to fulfill the obligations adopted by our state and declared in the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan and at the international level.

We have refused to fulfill the obligations our state has both before the people and before the global community.

We have completely lost the credit of political confidence in the civilized world. In such cases the economic confidence, business cooperation confidence are also ruled out. The economic default inevitably follows the political one. This is only the matter of time. The economy of Kazakhstan is organized in such a way and it participates in such a way in the global economic system, that the political losses inevitably entail financial and economic losses.

Our business circles have begun to pay for all this.

But most importantly, the people of Kazakhstan, the common people have already started to pay for this.

And this has inevitably to be followed by another, backward wave. We will be facing the internal political default. The authorities do not fulfill the commitments to the people and as a result the authorities will completely loose people’s credit of political confidence. And again this is the question of time.

The most dangerous thing about every default is its long-term consequences. It is impossible today to announce default, and tomorrow again enter the respectable society, as if nothing has happen.

Once one has not fulfilled the obligation, it will take one decades to repair the credit of just ordinary confidence. And other people will have to repair it, not those who were responsible for the declared default.

The same goes for politics. Our political and economic reputation in the world can not be repaired without drastic changes any more, both at organizational and at personal levels.

In my opinion there is still another problem which is more important. It often happens so that having lost confidence in concrete authorities, people loose confidence in the authority at all. Having lost confidence in concrete politicians, people loose confidence in the state and policy in general. And this is, perhaps, is one of the most horrid consequences of the political default.